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15.1 Introduction
The performance of a country is more often evaluated in terms of too high an
unemployment rate than too high earnings1 inequality. The technological
decisions of the ﬁrms in developed countries have been held responsible for
the employment rate, but their impact on earnings dispersion is much less
debated. By the same token, labour market regulation is alleged to move the
economic system away from the macroeconomic equilibrium, as the min-
imum wage and the employment protection legislation (EPL) reduce labour
demand and slow down the ﬂow of the younger labour force towards
employment; nevertheless, the focus is on the target for the employment rate
more than on how wide earnings inequality should be tolerated. Recently,
wages as well as earnings inequality has gained momentum – almost to the
same extent of employment and unemployment rates – not only on equity
but also on eﬃciency grounds, as the ﬁrms’ production process is considered
a co-determining factor in the evolution of pay disparities.2
It is apparent that wage dispersion is strictly interwoven with employment
rates across skill levels, as they are jointly determined by the trajectories
followed by ﬁrms in choosing their productive techniques, as well as by
labour market institutions providing insurance to risk-averse workers against
unemployment and low wages. In addition, the competitive pressure of
imports from the developing countries is part of the explanation of the switch
to labour-saving techniques.3
Very scant research work has been carried on so far to provide empirical
evidence on the technological patterns determined by restrictions placed by
labour market regulation on the employers’ production decisions. We aim at
contributing to ﬁll this gap by studying the impact of technological choices
on earnings dispersion when institutional constraints narrow the capacity of
the ﬁrm to decide on the employment level and on the productive techniques
combining high-skill and low-skill workers.
Our empirical investigation concerns the European economies after the
recession of the early 1990s. In Section 15.2, we compare diﬀerent
approaches to the analysis of the interaction between technology and
institutions. In Section 15.3, for each country under scrutiny and for each
sector the skill premium (SP) and the high-skill ratio (HR) are related to
the index of earning dispersion (EDI) (Gini 1914) we use in order to dis-
entangle the combined eﬀect of earnings and employment percentages of
high-, intermediate-, and low-skill workers. In Section 15.4, evidence is pre-
sented to account for the evolution of wages and employment at the
sectoral level and a Theil decomposition (Theil 1972) is accomplished so to
analyse the trends in earnings and wage dispersion between-sectors and
within-sectors. Section 15.5 concludes.
15.2 The impact of technologies and institutions on
employment and wage levels
The opinion about the trends of employment rates and earnings inequality in
the European Union is sharply divided. The empirical investigation indicates
that in the past decades bargaining institutions have been compressing the
wage distribution, thus causing lower employment of the less educated male
workers while female employment has been rising along with an increase in
the participation rate (Blau and Kahn 2000). According to the view recently
proposed by the OECD, by compressing wages, labour market regulation
hampers labour demand. The clue is that those European countries where
earnings inequality has risen more than average during the 1990s also appear
to have experienced a relative increase in employment (and a relative decrease
in unemployment).4 Other studies contend this interpretation by showing that
the sign of the correlation between the employment rate and the earnings
inequality turns out to be negative when reference is made to the household
level,5 and for jobs in traditional sectors.6
The OECD view relies upon a well-known approach to wage inequality in
Europe, which interprets the labour market performances of European coun-
tries as a result of the degree of labour market regulation (Krugman 1994).
According to the Krugman hypothesis, a downward shift in the relative
labour demand for low-skill workers is expected to result in a higher wage
inequality in countries characterized by a ﬂexible labour market and in a
higher unemployment rate in countries characterized by a rigid labour mar-
ket. In fact, the tenet is widely shared that starting from the end of the 1970s
in many European countries labour market institutions have increasingly
protected the wages of the insiders, at the cost of a lift in structural
unemployment in the two subsequent decades. Under wage compression,
employment and participation rates of the low-skill labour force were stuck,
especially in those sectors more exposed to harsher international
competition.
The Krugman hypothesis was anticipating that in Europe – diﬀerently
from what was happening in the US where a ﬂexible labour market exists –
wage inequality would have decreased, as a consequence of persistent
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unemployment causing a much lower proportion of low-pay workers at the
bottom of the wage distribution.7 Yet, data for the 1980s and the early 1990s
seem to indicate a fall in labour demand not only for the low-skill but also for
the high-skill workers; in addition, in the second half of the 1990s labour
market deregulation is alleged to have improved the overall employment rate
in most EU countries, due to an increasing number of low-skill workers in
low-pay jobs, albeit at the cost of widening the wage inequality.8 While the
implementation of active labour market programmes (ALMP) was expected
to raise workers’ skills and capabilities, and cause an upgrading in wage
levels, with possible reduction in wage and/or earnings disparities (Agell 1999
and 2002), other labour market reforms have favoured the expansion of jobs
for low-skill workers with temporary labour contracts (Layard and Nickell
1999).
Empirical evidence also indicates that economic growth has remained
sluggish in Europe, a possible reason being an interaction between institu-
tions and technological choices which determines an inverse correlation
between productivity and employment (van Ark et al. 2003). During the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s, productivity gains largely came from the expulsion of low-
skill workers; later on, in the period 1996–2001, a rising labour input caused
the slowdown in labour productivity and in wage levels at the bottom of the
wage distribution (Blanchard 2004 and 2006). Wage levels for every skill level
seems to be inﬂuenced in Europe by investment decisions made by ﬁrms
driven by the need to cope with productivity of workers at a constant
employment level (Pischke 2005).
These studies suggest that an alternative to the Krugman’s view can be
envisaged. The inﬂuence of institutions does not absolutely orient ﬁrms
towards the choice of labour-saving techniques, thus compressing the wage
distribution and enlarging the unemployment rate. Technological patterns
diﬀer, depending on sectoral characteristics, the skill distribution of the
labour force, and a varying degree of labour market regulation.
The two main technological strategies conceived by Acemoglu (1999, 2002)
respond to diﬀerent combinations of these factors. The ﬁrst strategy is the
skill-biased technical change (SBTC) driven by the ICT-intensive producing
and using sectors. The incentive of high proﬁts stemming from investment in
innovation determined in the United States a strong labour demand for
highly educated workers, well above the rising supply of new entrants in the
labour market with university degrees, thus widening the wage distance
between high-skill and low-skill workers (the so-called skill premium). Empir-
ical evidence conﬁrms that wider wage dispersion across skill levels in the US
manufacturing was a result of skill-biased organizational changes both
within and across plants (Dunne et al. 2004).
Acemoglu presents a production function with constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES):
Y(t) = [(AL (t) L (t))
ρ + (AH (t) H (t))
ρ]1/ρ
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where ρ ≤ 1, and its implicit relative labour demand function, expressing the
skill premium, is:
WHi
WL
=
AH /AL
(H/L)−(1 − ρ)
=
(AH /AL)
(σ − 1)
(H/L)− 1/σ
The skill premium depends on AH and AL, the factor-augmenting techno-
logical terms, and on the elasticity of substitution – σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) – between
the high-skill (H) and the low-skill (L) workers. The condition for the imple-
mentation of SBTC is labour market ﬂexibility. The productivity gaps created
by SBTC between the high-skill and the low-skill workers through AH and AL
respectively should be reﬂected by the wage and employment gaps between
these two groups of workers. Under the condition of σ > 1, a rising wage
inequality is explained by an increase in the AH /AL ratio higher than the H/L
ratio, which raises the relative wage rate for the more educated and more
productive high-skill workers.
In many European countries the SBTC could not develop, as ﬁrms have
been suﬀering from an opportunity set of production techniques restrained
by labour market institutions, with job protection and minimum wage play-
ing a very relevant role (Acemoglu 2003). To equalize the low-skill workers
productivity to their wage above the equilibrium level, employers would have
been compelled to resort to ‘complementary technologies’, whereby low-skill
workers share functions and mansions with high-skill workers so raising their
labour performances. Diﬀerently from the Krugman interpretation, the com-
pany facing a rigid labour market does not remain passive, but adjusts its
productive technology in order to cope with possible ineﬃciencies connected
to labour market regulation.
To understand why labour market regulation may have prevented Europe
from following the skill-biased technological trajectories which characterized
the US economy during the 1990s, we construct an example, inspired by
Acemoglu (2003), to describe an institutionally-constrained technological
decision. Suppose labour market regulation consists of a minimum wage
equal to 6 and an EPL causing high ﬁring costs. Assume that in a ﬁrm one
high-skill worker and one low-skill worker are employed, and the bargaining
makes the wage to be equal to ¾ and ½ of productivity for the high skills and
the low skills respectively. The high-skill worker’s productivity is equal to 24,
so that her wage level is 18, while the low-skill worker productivity is equal to
8, but must be paid the minimum wage 6 instead of 4, thus exceeding the ½ of
productivity. Total production is 32, total wages are 24, and proﬁts are 8.
Now suppose a switch to SBTC, through an innovative investment which
costs 1 to the ﬁrm. As a second high-skill worker substitutes the low-skill
worker, the two high-skill workers are paid, as before, ¾ of productivity. Total
production rises to 48, so that the minimum wage would no longer be binding
and proﬁts increase to 11 (= 48 − 36 − 1). Alternatively, in order to avoid pos-
sibly prohibitive ﬁring costs, but still escape the minimum-wage constraint,
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the ﬁrm could lay out an investment in a ‘complementary technology’,
whereby the low-skill worker shares mansions with the high-skill worker. The
employer could consider an investment, assumed to cost 2 and allowing the
low-skill worker’s productivity to rise from 8 to 12, while the high-skill
worker’s productivity stays at 24. Since total production would be 36, the
minimum wage would not be binding, and proﬁts would increase to 10
(= 36 − 24 − 2).
While proﬁts appear to be higher with the SBTC, we did not quantify yet
the ﬁring costs. Under the SBTC the low-skill worker could not be substi-
tuted, but must be paid even if he does not take part in production, until the
legal dispute is settled. Hence, whether or not the SBTC dominates the
‘complementary technology’ depends on the eﬀect of the second institutional
factor – the EPL – combining with the minimum wage. If the job protection
legislation is such to determine a ﬁring cost higher than 1, the higher
proﬁtability warranted by the SBTC vanishes.
The rationale conveyed by the numerical example is that when the higher
proﬁts permitted by SBTC cannot be obtained, as litigation costs discourage
ﬁring the low-skill workers, a ‘complementary technology’ may be chosen,
allowing the low-skill workers’ productivity to match the minimum wage. By
pointing to the adjustment of technology to institutions, this view may
explain why SBTC has spread in Europe to a much lesser extent than in the
US. Yet, a comprehensive analysis considering diﬀerent labour market
institutions across the European countries constraining the employers’ tech-
nological decisions, and their fall-out on labour demand and the wage level
for diﬀerent skill groups, is still lacking.9
This interpretative impasse over interactions between technology and
institutions as the determinant of earnings dispersion is conﬁrmed by simple
calculations. On the basis of the information provided by the ECHP dataset,
covering the 15 EU countries (hereafter, EU-15) in the years 1994–2001, we
have computed for each country a Gini index for wages net of taxes as well as
the ratio of working (with an employer in paid job for at least 15 hours per
week) to total population. Since the ECHP dataset only surveys the popula-
tion aged at least 16, this ‘working ratio’ is meant to be more informative of
both (1) the employment rate,10 as it focuses on the self-declared employed,
while keeping information about the population structure like the activity
rate does; and (2) the activity rate,11 as it provides information on the working
population net of the unemployed and of children under 16. The picture is
uplifted, but does not change substantially, when the working ratio is referred
to all employed persons including the self-employed and those with unpaid
work in family enterprise.
Figure 15.1 shows the scatter diagram of the Gini indices and the working
ratio for the waves 1 (1994), 4 (1997) and 8 (2001). The Scandinavian coun-
tries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) tend to show higher-than-average
working ratios and lower-than-average net wage inequality, so are to be found
in the upper left section of the diagram. The Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland
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and the United Kingdom) tend to occupy the upper right section, presenting
on the whole higher-than-average levels both for employment (Ireland moves
from lower- to higher-than-average working ratios during the eight years of
the survey) and for net wage inequality. The Continental countries (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) are posi-
tioned in the middle of the picture and the Mediterranean countries (Italy,
Greece, Portugal and Spain) in general show the lowest employment rates
and, with the exception of Portugal, are found at the bottom of the diagram.
Therefore, no evidence of a uniﬁed pattern for employment and wage dis-
persion emerges in the eight-year period throughout the EU-15, let alone
when focusing on the evolution across countries, as the role institutions play
in each country is unclear. On the one hand, the wage distribution of Euro-
pean economies was certainly aﬀected by the large movements in employ-
ment rates of the 1990s. After the sharp fall in unemployment had caused the
1990–93 recession in the whole EU except Germany (whose cycle was over-
heated by the inﬂationary consequences of reuniﬁcation), the recovery in
growth rates in the second half of the decade boosted an Europe-wide
increase in the employment rates, also signalled by a structural break in
econometric estimates (Mourre 2004; Arpaia and Mourre 2005). On the
other hand, in many econometric estimates ‘(c)ountry dummies explain a
larger proportion of the relation between wage inequality and unemploy-
ment’ (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002: 18). Hence, diﬀering ‘initial conditions’
across countries – such as technological gaps in the productive structure and
the impact of the educational system on the skill distribution of the labour
force12 – could have diﬀerently impinged both on the employment perform-
ance and earnings disparities. The EU-15 widespread heterogeneity in the
relationship between employment and earnings dispersion may conceal
the presence of more profound regularities beneath under aggregate data. In
Figure 15.1 Working ratios and Gini net wages in the EU-15 (1994, 1997, 2001)
262 Lorenz and Gini in applied economics
the following, we exploit the availability of microdata directly observing the
human capital of the employed workers through matching between skills and
working positions.
15.3 The evolution of employment rates and earnings inequality
in Europe
Research and empirical evidence about employment growth and wage disper-
sion across skill levels is very scant. A recent IMF investigation far from
conveys the real picture, as ‘due to available data, (. . .) results relate to
income shares of workers in skilled and un-skilled sectors, rather than to
income shares of skilled and un-skilled workers themselves’ (IMF 2007: 168).
To ﬁnd out how interactions between institutions and technology impact on
earnings distribution, we enquire how the rise in ICT investment relates both
to the skill premium and the larger utilization of low-skill and low-pay work-
ers permitted by the relaxation of employment and wage rigidities. In fact, a
measure of earnings inequality is needed whereby in measuring earnings
dispersion changes in employment across skill levels are taken into account.
For instance, in the event of recourse to the strategy of SBTC, due to the
decrease induced by labour-saving techniques in the number of low-skill
workers, the widening of wage disparities could have been underestimated by
the computation of earnings dispersion.
The ECHP dataset permits the breakdown of earnings distribution across
18 economic sectors and 20 working positions, shown in Appendix 15.1 and
15.2, respectively. All information was re-aggregated in three macro-sectors
according to their link with information and communication technologies
(ICT)13: ICT producing (A), intensively ICT users (B), and less intensive
utilizing sectors (C), both for manufacturing (1) and Services (2), while work-
ing positions were aggregated into three skill levels: high (H), intermediate (I)
and low (L). Our investigation covers seven European countries – Belgium,
Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom –
whose sectoral structure in terms of employment is shown in Appendix 15.3
for wave 1 (1994) and wave 8 (2001). The reason behind this selection is to
refer our analysis to clusters of countries characterized by similar labour
markets institutions, so as to compare the cluster of the so-called Continental
countries to a representative country from each cluster, namely the United
Kingdom for the Anglo-Saxon, Denmark for the Scandinavian and Italy for
the Mediterranean cluster.
Variations in the skill premium (SP) – the wedge across wages: SP = wH /
wL – are contrasted with variations in the ‘high-skill ratio’ (HR), the fraction
of high-to-lower skill workers, where HR = H / (I + L). While the SP signals
how the employees’ bargaining power interacts with the ﬁrm’s choice of
techniques, the HR signals how the relative proportions of workers across
skill categories evolve over time by following this choice.
To better characterize this empirical background, we devise four patterns
Earnings dispersion 263
of technological choices, depending on a varying combination of techno-
logical choices and institutions: (1) SBTC; (2) Complementary Technology;
(3) Restructuring; (4) Downsizing.
(1) In case regulation does not constrain the substitution of capital and
high-skill workers to low-skill workers, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to intro-
duce labour-saving techniques. The presence of SBTC manifests in an
increase of both SP and HR, as the high skill-intensive techniques implying
the expulsion of low-skill workers push up the share of high-skill workers vis-
à-vis the low-skill and low-pay workers; (2) In case regulation constrains,
ﬁrms realize complementary technologies by investing in low-skill workers
when EPL inhibits their dismissal due to high ﬁring costs (i.e. too high litiga-
tion costs in the courts) and their productivity has to be raised to the level of
the minimum wage (legally imposed or defended by unions). The choice of a
‘complementary technology’ entails a decrease both in the SP and in the HR,
through the reduction of minimum wage and/or the relaxation of EPL
enlarging the relative number of intermediate and low-skill workers. Firms
might also choose intermediate strategies resulting from the inﬂuence of add-
itional variables, such as the country’s productive structure and the peculiar
skill characteristics of the labour force; (3) the restructuring strategy, whereby
the retrenchment of the low-skill traditional productions under the com-
petitiveness pressure of developing economies causes the loss (or the out-
sourcing) of low-pay jobs, so that in spite of deregulation wage compression
remains (or SP even falls) and the high-skill to low-skill workers ratio (HR)
increases; (4) the downsizing strategy, whereby labour market deregulation
prompts the structural change towards small-size ﬁrms, with a higher per-
centage of low-skill workers in the presence of lowering wage rates, so caus-
ing an increase in SP and a fall in HR.
The four patterns of technological choices, reﬂecting diﬀerent decisions
about product and process innovation taken by ﬁrms under institutional con-
straints, are reﬂected by the measure of earnings dispersion. Figure 15.2
shows the construction of the earnings dispersion index (EDI) where workers
are ranked on the basis of their average wages (and corresponding skill level).
Unlike the more usual Gini index, where percentiles are equally numerous,
the population on the X axis has been partitioned into three groups (k = 3)
denoted by α, β and γ, where α + β + γ = 1, corresponding to the three skill
levels, from lowest to highest; while on the Y axis sα, sβ and sγ, where, again,
sα + sβ + sγ = 1, indicate their respective earnings shares. The EDI are calcu-
lated as the ratio between the area (λ) limited by the diagonal and the Lorenz
curve, and the whole triangle area. Were we unable to measure the separate
inﬂuence of skill premium and wage distance between high-skill and low-skill
workers, it would have been diﬃcult to go back to the cause of variation of
the EDI. However, by construction, it is apparent that EDI varies depending
on the relative strength of the variation in SP and HR. As we will now see, the
computation of the EDI reveals that earnings dispersion augments in many
macro-sectors. No clear evidence results for 13 cases only (over the 42 cases
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examined), since the lines for the initial (1994) and the ﬁnal (2001) year cross
each other.
In Figure 15.3, manufacturing and services have been re-aggregated into
six macro-sectors (ICT producing, ICT intensive using, and ICT less inten-
sive using, both for manufacturing and services) as described above. Wage
disparities are computed by using average wage levels for each sector and
category of high-intermediate- and low-skill workers, and allowing for a vary-
ing number of workers in each category.
Table 15.1 classiﬁes the variations of SP and HR between 1994 and 2001 by
attributing – for each country – the macro-sectors to one of the four strategies
on the basis of the sign of their variation and also specifying whether the EDI
would increase or decrease. Upward movements of both SP and HR hint to
SBTC and result in a rising EDI, because the enlarging wage distance
between skill levels happens to be more relevant than the expulsion of low-
skill workers. Complementary technology, which corresponds to both SP and
HR moving downwards, is found in a minority of cases and mainly in Con-
tinental countries. An SP increase (probably due to a lowering of low-skill
wages) larger than the HR reduction (a clue to a modest improvement in job
creation) suggests the evolution towards a downsizing strategy, which is
mainly chosen by ﬁrms not involved in the ICT revolution with an high
percentage of low-skill workers.
The most frequent strategy in Europe seems to be the restructuring strat-
egy, as a decreasing SP and an increasing HR point to the prevalence of
reduction of low-skill jobs in the presence of wage compression, both in
manufacturing and in service sectors. All Denmark macro-sectors manifest
SP and HR variations indicating restructuring; the Netherlands and Ger-
many follow, with three macro-sectors each. However, due to the crossing of
Figure 15.2 Earnings dispersion index (EDI)
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Figure 15.3 EDI, SP and HR. First diﬀerences for 7 EU countries (1994–2001)
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the initial and ﬁnal lines, the computation of EDI does not oﬀer a clear
interpretation for the complementary technology and the restructuring
strategy.
The United Kingdom is the only country where all macro-sectors (except
the producing ICT service sectors14) present the sign of variations of SP and
HR corresponding to the choice of SBTC. Only a few countries – in particu-
lar France and Italy, both in intensive and less intensive ICT using manu-
facturing – present SP and HR variations corresponding to complementary
technologies. Finally, the downsizing strategy is conﬁrmed by the EDI
increasing in four over six cases. This technological choice, which is shown by
earnings dispersion varying as an eﬀect of rising low-skill employment levels
more than of the wage wedge, seems to be followed essentially by Belgium
(where low-skill employment increases concern in two out of six macro-
sectors), and by the ICT-producing service sectors of Germany, France and
Italy.
15.4 Theil decomposition of earnings dispersion between and
within sectors
Whatever the direction of the SP and HR values, the above picture could be
distorted by movements in the earnings inequality indicators occurring
between sectors rather than within sectors. The values of the earnings
inequality computed by the EDI could therefore conceal a compositional
eﬀect.
The strong increase in the EU-15 employment during the second half of
the 1990s stems mostly from the creation of new jobs in market-related ser-
vices, which experienced a very strong value-added growth (Marimon and
Zilibotti 1998). In fact, labour market ﬂexibility fuelled the process of job
shifting from the more capital-intensive manufacturing sectors to low-
productivity and low-pay service sectors. In the period 1997–2001, job inten-
sity of growth (the ratio of employment growth to value-added growth)
reached very high values in ﬁnancial, real estate renting and business services.
Also in sectors like trade, repairs, hotels and restaurant, transport and
communication, characterized by a large percentage of self-employment
and temporary positions, employment has grown at a faster pace than in
manufacturing and the relative price of labour has fallen accordingly.
The employment expansion in the EU-15 services sector has concerned
both high-skill researchers, engineers and managers in the ICT-producing
and -using sectors, and low-skill workers in technology extension and provi-
sion of software service either to ﬁrms or directly to consumers. In the
labour-intensive service sectors the employment increases has instead
involved the utilisation of intermediate-skill workers, in operations which
cannot be informatized by ﬁrms in manufacturing (for instance, the out-
sourcing of non-routine occupations by computer-using companies). Finally,
in more recent years the production and use of ICT has started increasing
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also in the EU-15, with investment in ICT reaching 18 per cent over total
investment and contributing 42 per cent of labour productivity growth; in the
US these percentages were 29 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively (Denis et
al. 2005).
These structural changes legitimate the suspicion that a compositional
eﬀect might play a part in explaining developments in employment growth.
The ‘Baumol disease’ hypothesis predicts that productivity growth rates are
lower in the service sectors characterized by routine occupations than in
manufacturing. Since labour market deregulation should translate diﬀeren-
tial productivity growth into wider wage diﬀerentials, low-skill workers are
expected to move from manufacturing to service occupations. In increasing
the employment levels, the expansion of the service sectors could have been a
more important factor than the interaction between technology and
institutions.
Consequenly, the variation in wage inequality in the period 1994–2001
could have been diﬀerent from the variation in earnings inequality. Due to a
varying speed of relaxation of constraints posed by labour market institu-
tions on employment growth in services across European countries, the
measurement of within-sectors earnings inequality could have been aﬀected
by a shift of workers towards self-employment and/or by a rising share of
temporary contracts in services’ jobs. These two phenomena artiﬁcially
reduce the breadth of earnings inequality, thus underestimating the gap
between earnings inequality and wage inequality.
To get an idea of this possible bias, we computed the Theil decomposition,
both for the earnings and the wage distributions. By separating out the
between-sectors vis-à-vis the within-sectors inequality, we aim to assess
the relative expansion of the service sector. It is also worth noticing that the
between-sector component refers to reallocation of resources across indus-
tries due to market share reshuﬄing among sectors, as well as entry and exit.
A rising market contestability encourages ﬁrms to invest in innovation mainly
when the sector and/or the country is close to the technological frontier, and
the incumbents are under the threat of a Schumpeterian process of imitation
(Aghion et al. 2005). Hence, a stimulus to technical change as an eﬀect of
deregulation also depends on how far from the technological frontier in the
middle of the 1990s the manufacturing and service sectors of the EU-15
economies were.
The Theil decomposition in the within-sectors and the between-sectors
variation of the earnings and the wage inequality described in Figure 15.4
was conducted on the ECHP dataset over the whole 18 sectors of the seven
EU countries for the period 1994–2001. Self-employed workers and tempor-
ary contracts are the main source of divergence between the earnings and
wage measures of dispersion, as well as across employment rates. Hence,
evidence showing that the same variations happen within and between sectors
for both measures (wages of employees as well as total remunerations) will be
taken as an indicator that the expansion of service sectors is not signiﬁcantly
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aﬀecting the wage and earnings trends, so that the measurement of the EDI
should not be biased by a composition eﬀect. On the contrary, where the
evolution of earnings inequality between sectors does not ﬁnd conﬁrmation
for wages – or the change in between-sectors inequality indices signiﬁcantly
Figure 15.4 Sectoral earnings dispersion within and between sectors: 1994 (1) and
2001 (8)
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diﬀers from the change for the within-sectors indices – the composition eﬀect
consisting of a disproportionate rise in self-employment and/or temporary
positions in the expanding service sectors is likely to be at work.
Since in most countries the sign of variation of the inequality indices
replicates both for wages and earnings as well as for the within- and the
between-sectors components, the Theil decomposition seems to signal that
the evidence of a composition eﬀect is not impressive. The earnings and wage
inequality appear to increase in most Continental countries (Belgium, Ger-
many, the Netherlands), while is decreasing in France both for the within and
between indices.
However, the United Kingdom presents a higher inequality for earnings
and a lower inequality for wages, both within and between sectors (see Table
15.2). This is a clear indicator of an upward trend of the earnings of self-
employed workers, to a larger extent in the technology-based services,
whereas the wage wedge among the dependent workers is shrinking in both
the Theil components. In other words, the contemporaneous increase of the
two indices of earnings dispersion signals that the income gap of self-
employed workers (and, possibly, also some mistaken reporting of the pay of
temporary contracts) widens both in terms of average wage across sectors
and in terms of within-sectors dispersion, possibly increasing the gap of the
upper portion of the earnings distribution due to the relative expansion of
the ICT service companies.
Two countries show uneven results across Theil decomposition. Italy
shows a tendency towards shrinking disparities across sectors both for wage
and total remunerations. Since sectors characterized by a lower-than-average
wage level appear to be approaching the high-average wage sectors, the
expansion of the services does not seem to concern the technology-based
sectors. Contrary to the overall trend, a composition eﬀect – wherever present
– is perhaps driving the earnings distribution towards compression. Denmark
appears to join the Continental countries as for the within-sector inequality
indices, while the between-sectors earnings dispersion decreases. The broad
message is that a divide has probably opened between those European econ-
omies where investments in the ICT sectors have increased the salaries of
highly-educated self-employed workers and the European laggards both in
product and process innovation and in the formation of human capital.
Table 15.2 First diﬀerences in wages and earnings inequality within and between
sectors (1994–2001)
within inequality between inequality
earnings earnings
+ − + −
wages + B, D, DK, I, NL wages + B, D, NL DK
− UK F − UK F, I
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15.5 Concluding remarks
Our aim in this chapter was to show that European ﬁrms, in contrast to the
hypothesis put forward by Krugman, do not stay passive in the face of insti-
tutional constraints but their technological choices are meant to combine
productive strategies with labour-market conditions.
During the 1990s, a wide range of productive strategies were implemented
in European countries, as witnessed by the variety of variations experienced
by the skill premium and by the high-skill ratio. The earnings dispersion
index suggests that the most frequent technological decisions taken by Euro-
pean ﬁrms in the second half of the 1990s can be regarded as a restructuring
strategy. The recourse to complementary technology has not been practised
much by ﬁrms. The likely explanation is that institutional reforms imple-
mented during the 1990s in the EU-15 labour markets have introduced wage
ﬂexibility – and also the abatement of job protection, though to a lesser
extent – which enlarged the opportunity set of technological choices with
respect to the previous period (to which the Acemoglu hypothesis refers).
To the question whether rising earnings dispersion in European countries
during the 1990s stemmed from SBTC, the computation of the EDI analysis
provides a negative answer, except in the case of the United Kingdom.15
Hence, our computation conﬁrms that the United Kingdom largely diﬀeren-
tiates from the other EU countries as the only productive structure where the
presence of skill-biased techniques is pervasive. The UK is also the only
country for which the computation of the Theil decomposition clearly shows
that a composition eﬀect, due to the expansion of the technology-based ser-
vice sectors, drifts the evolution of the earnings dispersion away from the
wage dispersion, due to the increasing number of high-income high-skill
workers disproportionately widening the earnings distribution.
Notes
1 In the following, earnings disparities (i.e. all workers: employees and self-
employed) are analysed; when labour is limited to the sub-set of employees only,
reference will be made to wage disparities (which include wages and salaries).
2 Huge diﬃculties both on theoretical and on empirical grounds arise when labour
needs be precisely separated from capital (for the self-employed) and in particular
from human capital (for the skilled labour). Although some corrections have been
proposed and extensively relied upon (Guscina 2006), so far they have been mainly
regarded as rules of thumb. The empirical ﬂair of this chapter, based on microdata
supplied by ECHP, makes the debate about the deﬁnition of labour somewhat
unnecessary: ‘total net personal income’ (PI100) is broken down into ‘total net
income from work’ (PI110), ‘non-work private income’ (PI120) and ‘total social
insurance receipts’ (PI130); in turn, code PI110 is broken down into ‘wage and
salary earnings’ (PI111) and ‘self-employment income’ (PI112), while ‘capital
income’ is coded PI121. Data availability has induced the choice of the variable
PI110, and the inclusion of the warning.
3 Globalization and trade openness also propose an explanation for recent devel-
opments, such as a rising ratio of temporary over long-term labour contracts and
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a rising earnings inequality (Feenstra 2007). We do not directly deal with inter-
national trade, but its impact on earnings dispersion is at least partially embodied
in the way in which technological and institutional factors interact in the
determination of jobs and pays.
4 ‘Employment and unemployment developments – in particular, the relative
employment of youths and older persons of working age – tended to be less
favourable in countries in which earnings inequality rose more slowly since 1970
(or fell), than in countries where the earnings inequality rose more rapidly. Fur-
thermore, the apparent trade-oﬀ between a strong employment performance and a
more equal distribution of earnings appears to have worsened, consistent with
relative labour demand having shifted towards high-skill workers’ (OECD 2004:
129).
5 ‘Unlike for earnings inequality among full-time employed individuals, for pretax-
pretransfer income among households we observe sizeable increases over time in
most countries. This development appears to have been driven to an important
extent by changes in employment. In countries with better employment perform-
ance, low-earning households beneﬁted relative to high-earning ones; in nations
with poor employment performance, low-earning households fared worse.’
(Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005: 21–2).
6 ‘In sum, our examination of the wage compression hypothesis (like that of the
other empirical researchers) ﬁnds little support for the belief that lack of jobs in
the EU is due to the eﬀect of the compression of wages on employment in low skill
industries’ (Freeman and Schettkat 2001: 25).
7 Atkinson and Brandolini (2006) have drawn attention to the unemployment rate
as a major cause of variation of wage and salaries inequality by taking into
account the diﬀerences between skilled and unskilled workers.
8 In the year 2000 temporary contracts were 13.4 per cent in the EU-15, ranging
from over 33 per cent in the ‘outlier’ Spain, to 6.7 per cent in the United Kingdom
and below 5 per cent in Ireland and Luxembourg.
9 Additional factors are likely to be involved in the evolution of technological
choices, ﬁrst of all the conditions of competitiveness of the market structure, as
studied by the rapidly developing literature on the negative impact on growth and
employment of rigid goods and labour markets (Bassanini, Hemmings and
Scarpetta 2001; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).
10 While the employment rate refers to the percentage of workers who actually have
jobs, diﬀerent deﬁnitions co-exist: Eurostat refers to the employed persons aged
15–64 as a percentage of the same age population; the UK Oﬃce for National
Statistics (ONS) refers to the proportion of the working age population who are in
employment: aged 16–64 if men, 16–59 if women. In addition the deﬁnitions of
both workers and jobs may diﬀer, for example, as to whether the job is paid and
the weekly hours are at least 15.
11 Similarly, the activity rate refers to the percentage of working population; how-
ever, Eurostat deﬁnes activity rate of the labour force as a percentage of the
population of working age (15–64), the Italian ISTAT refers to the ratio between
labour force and the population over 15, while the UK ONS refers to the popula-
tion over 16. Since these deﬁnitions diﬀer, a cross-country comparison is more
easily referred to the ﬁrst diﬀerences than in terms of absolute values.
12 However, the measurement of the technological level of workers through the gen-
eral educational attainment of the population leads to inconsistency problems
(Croci Angelini and Farina 2007).
13 The six macro-sectors are formed by re-aggregating the 18 ECHP manufacturing
and service sectors according to the classiﬁcation used by the European
Commission services (see Denis et al. 2005).
14 Among the most important sub-sectors of the producing ICT service sectors,
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computer services are lacking, as the ECHP does not classify them in a separate
category. Hence, the measurement of the EDI for this sub-sector is likely to be
biased.
15 These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by recent studies comparing the growth perform-
ances of the EU and the US economies. During the 1990s, for the ﬁrst time in the
last two decades, both the capital deepening and the TFP presented growth rates
lower in the EU than in the US. While the declining capital investment in Europe
might be partially explained by the end of the capital-for-labour substitution
which followed the rise in the wage/proﬁt rate, the second indicator deﬁnitely
points to lower rate of innovation and ICT investment in the EU vis-à-vis the US
(O’Mahony and van Ark 2003). Moreover, in the EU a productivity growth in the
ICT-producing manufacturing industries much lower than the US one was only
partially counteracted by the relatively better productivity performance in ICT-
using manufacturing and ICT-producing services in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s (van
Ark et al. 2003).
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Appendix 15.1
Table 15.A.1 Sectoral breakdown
Codes Labels Sectors
A + B Agriculture, hunting and forestry + Fishing Other
C Mining and quarrying C1
DA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco C1
DB + DC Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products C1
DD + DE Manufacture oﬀ wood and paper products; publishing and
printing
B1
DF − DI Manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum/chemicals/rubber and
plastic/products etc.
B1
DJ + DK Manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipment n.e.c. A1
DL − DN Other manufacturing A1
E Electricity, gas and water supply C2
F Construction Other
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles
and personal/household goods
Other
H Hotels and restaurants Other
I Transport, storage and communication A2
J Financial intermediation B2
K Real estate, renting and business activities C2
L Public administration and defense; compulsory social security Other
M Education Other
N Health and social work Other
O − Q Other community, social and personal service activities; private
households with employed persons; extra-territorial
organizations and bodies
Other
−8 not applicable
−9 missing
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Appendix 15.2
Table 15.A.2 Occupational breakdown
CodesLabels Class
1112 Legislators, senior oﬃcials + Corporate managers H
1300 Managers of small enterprises H
2122 Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals + Life
science and health professionals
H
2300 Teaching professionals H
2400 Other professionals H
3132 Physical and engineering science professionals + Life science and health
associate professionals
H
3334 Teaching associate professionals + Other associate professionals H
4142 Oﬃce clerks + Customer services clerks I
5100 Personal and protective services workers I
5200 Models, salespersons and demonstrators I
6100 Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers L
7174 Extraction and building trades workers + Other craft and related trades
workers
L
7273 Metal, machinery and related trades workers + Precision, handicraft,
printing and related trades workers
L
8183 Stationary-plant and related operators + Drivers and mobile-plant
operators
L
8200 Machine operators and assemblers L
8400 8 – Miscellaneous (ECHP-speciﬁc code) L
9100 Sales and services elementary occupations L
9200 Agricultural, ﬁshery and related laborers L
9300 Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport L
9400 9 – Miscellaneous (ECHP-speciﬁc code) L
−8 not applicable −8
−9 missing, armed forces, 5 – Miscellaneous (ECHP-speciﬁc code) −9
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Appendix 15.3
Table 15.A.3 Employment structure by country
wave 1 wave 1 wave 1 wave 1 wave 8 wave 8 wave 8 wave 8
Belgium H I L total H I L total
A1 0,02 0,02 0,06 0,10 0,02 0,01 0,06 0,09
B1 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,07 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,06
C1 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,04
A2 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,07
B2 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,05 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,06
C2 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,10 0,04 0,02 0,01 0,07
other 0,26 0,17 0,14 0,57 0,29 0,20 0,13 0,62
total 0,40 0,30 0,31 1,00 0,42 0,32 0,26 1,00
Germany H I L total H I L total
A1 0,05 0,02 0,08 0,15 0,05 0,01 0,11 0,18
B1 0,02 0,01 0,04 0,07 0,03 0,01 0,04 0,07
C1 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,03
A2 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,05
B2 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,05 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,04
C2 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,06 0,05 0,02 0,02 0,09
other 0,28 0,14 0,16 0,57 0,27 0,14 0,14 0,54
total 0,43 0,24 0,34 1,00 0,43 0,22 0,35 1,00
Denmark H I L total H I L total
A1 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,10 0,03 0,01 0,09 0,13
B1 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02
C1 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,03
A2 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,05
B2 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02
C2 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,08 0,06 0,01 0,01 0,08
other 0,25 0,20 0,18 0,63 0,31 0,21 0,15 0,67
total 0,38 0,27 0,36 1,00 0,44 0,27 0,29 1,00
France H I L total H I L total
A1 0,03 0,01 0,06 0,10 0,03 0,01 0,05 0,09
B1 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,05
C1 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,04
A2 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,06 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,06
B2 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,04 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,03
C2 0,05 0,02 0,03 0,10 0,06 0,03 0,03 0,11
other 0,23 0,19 0,19 0,61 0,23 0,20 0,17 6,00
total 0,37 0,27 0,37 1,00 0,38 0,28 0,34 1,00
Italy H I L total H I L total
A1 0,01 0,02 0,08 0,12 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,10
B1 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,05
C1 0,01 0,01 0,05 0,07 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,06
A2 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,06
B2 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,03
C2 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,09
other 0,16 0,20 0,26 0,62 0,17 0,24 0,21 0,62
total 0,24 0,30 0,46 1,00 0,26 0,34 0,40 1,00
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Table 15.A.3 continued
wave 1 wave 1 wave 1 wave 1 wave 8 wave 8 wave 8 wave 8
Netherlands H I L total H I L total
A1 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,05
B1 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,04
C1 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,03
A2 0,01 0,03 0,03 0,07 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,06
B2 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,04
C2 0,07 0,02 0,03 0,11 0,08 0,02 0,02 0,12
other 0,32 0,19 0,13 0,64 0,35 0,20 0,11 0,66
total 0,47 0,26 0,26 1,00 0,52 0,27 0,21 1,00
UK H I L total H I L total
A1 0,03 0,02 0,05 0,10 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,05
B1 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03
C1 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01
A2 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,04
B2 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02
C2 0,06 0,02 0,02 0,10 0,04 0,02 0,01 0,06
other 0,24 0,21 0,12 0,57 0,33 0,27 0,19 0,79
total 0,41 0,31 0,29 1,00 0,42 0,32 0,26 1,00
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